

Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games

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Nash equilibria of bimatrix games

$$A = \begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline 3 & 3 \\ \hline 2 & 5 \\ \hline 0 & 6 \\ \hline \end{array} \quad B = \begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline 1 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 2 \\ \hline 4 & 3 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

Nash equilibrium =

pair of strategies x , y with

x best response to y and

y best response to x .

Mixed equilibria

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 3 \\ 2 & 5 \\ 0 & 6 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$B = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 \\ 4 & 3 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$x = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1/3 \\ 2/3 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$y^T = \begin{bmatrix} 1/3 & 2/3 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$Ay = \begin{bmatrix} 3 \\ 4 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$x^T B = \begin{bmatrix} 8/3 & 8/3 \end{bmatrix}$$

only **pure best responses** can have probability > 0

Supports that don't work

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 3 \\ 2 & 5 \\ 0 & 6 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$B = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 \\ 4 & 3 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$x = \begin{bmatrix} ? \\ 0 \\ ? \end{bmatrix}$$

$$y^T = \begin{bmatrix} 1/2 & 1/2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$Ay = \begin{bmatrix} 3 \\ 3.5 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix}$$

infeasible for player I

Best response polyhedron H_2 for player 2


$$\begin{array}{c} \bar{y}_4 \quad \bar{y}_5 \\ \textcircled{1} \quad 3 \quad 3 \\ \textcircled{2} \quad 2 \quad 5 \\ \textcircled{3} \quad 0 \quad 6 \end{array} = A$$

$$H_2 = \{ (\bar{y}_4, \bar{y}_5, u) \mid$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \textcircled{1} : 3\bar{y}_4 + 3\bar{y}_5 \leq u \\ \textcircled{2} : 2\bar{y}_4 + 5\bar{y}_5 \leq u \\ \textcircled{3} : \quad \quad 6\bar{y}_5 \leq u \end{array}$$

$$\bar{y}_4 + \bar{y}_5 = 1$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \textcircled{4} : \bar{y}_4 \geq 0 \\ \textcircled{5} : \bar{y}_5 \geq 0 \end{array} \}$$



Best response polytope Q for player 2

$$\begin{array}{c} \textcircled{1} \\ \textcircled{2} \\ \textcircled{3} \end{array} \begin{array}{cc} y_4 & y_5 \\ \hline 3 & 3 \\ 2 & 5 \\ 0 & 6 \end{array} = A$$

$$Q = \{ y \mid Ay \leq 1, y \geq 0 \}$$

$$Q = \{ (y_4, y_5) \mid$$


$$\textcircled{1} : 3y_4 + 3y_5 \leq 1$$

$$\textcircled{2} : 2y_4 + 5y_5 \leq 1$$

$$\textcircled{3} : 6y_5 \leq 1$$



$$\textcircled{4} : y_4 \geq 0$$

$$\textcircled{5} : y_5 \geq 0 \}$$



Projective transformation

H_2, Q same face incidences



Best response polytope Q for player 2

$$\begin{array}{c} \textcircled{1} \\ \textcircled{2} \\ \textcircled{3} \end{array} \begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline y_4 & y_5 \\ \hline 3 & 3 \\ 2 & 5 \\ 0 & 6 \\ \hline \end{array} = A$$

$$Q = \{ y \mid Ay \leq 1, y \geq 0 \}$$

$$Q = \{ (y_4, y_5) \mid$$


$$\textcircled{1} : 3y_4 + 3y_5 \leq 1$$

$$\textcircled{2} : 2y_4 + 5y_5 \leq 1$$

$$\textcircled{3} : 6y_5 \leq 1$$

$$\textcircled{4} : y_4 \geq 0$$

$$\textcircled{5} : y_5 \geq 0 \}$$





Best response polytope P for player 1



$$\begin{array}{l} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{array} \begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline 1 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 2 \\ \hline 4 & 3 \\ \hline \end{array} = B$$

$\leq 1 \leq 1$

$$P = \{ x \mid x \geq 0, x^T B \leq 1 \}$$





Equilibrium = completely labeled pair





pure equilibrium

Equilibrium = completely labeled pair




mixed equilibrium


The Lemke–Howson algorithm




The Lemke–Howson algorithm




Drop label




The Lemke–Howson algorithm




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
The Lemke–Howson algorithm




Drop label




The Lemke–Howson algorithm




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
The Lemke–Howson algorithm




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
The Lemke–Howson algorithm




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
The Lemke–Howson algorithm




Drop label



The Lemke–Howson algorithm



Drop label



Why Lemke-Howson works



LH finds at least one Nash equilibrium because

- **finitely many** "vertices"

for nondegenerate (generic) games:

- **unique** starting edge given missing label
- **unique** continuation

⇒ precludes "coming back" like here:



Complexity of Lemke-Howson

- finds at least one Nash equilibrium,
pivots like Simplex algorithm for linear programming
- Simplex may be **exponential** [Klee-Minty cubes]
- exponentially many steps of Lemke-Howson
for **any** dropped label?
- **Yes!** This is our result.

Our result

There are $d \times d$ games with exactly one Nash equilibrium, for which the Lemke-Howson algorithm takes $\geq \phi^{3d/4}$ many steps for **any dropped label** (with **Golden Ratio** $\phi = (\sqrt{5} + 1) / 2 = 1.618\dots$)

We will show this extending


[Morris 1994] - exponentially long Lemke paths
(finds symmetric equilibria of symmetric games)

[von Stengel 1999] - games with many equilibria


using **dual cyclic polytopes**

Vertices as bit patterns

P



	1	2	3	4	5
	1	1	1	0	0
	1	1	0	1	0
	1	0	1	0	1
■	1	0	0	1	1
	0	0	1	1	1
	0	1	1	1	0





Q

	1	2	3	4	5
	0	0	0	1	1
	0	0	1	1	0
	0	1	1	0	0
	1	1	0	0	0
	1	0	0	0	1

Vertices as bit patterns

P



Q

	1	2	3	4	5		1	2	3	4	5
●	1	1	1	0	0		0	0	0	1	1
	1	1	0	1	0		0	0	1	1	0
	1	0	1	0	1		0	1	1	0	0
■	1	0	0	1	1		1	1	0	0	0
▲	0	0	1	1	1		1	0	0	0	1
⬠	0	1	1	1	0						


Cyclic polytopes

moment curve in \mathbb{R}^d

$$\mu : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^d \quad t \mapsto \mu(t) = (t, t^2, \dots, t^d)^\top.$$

cyclic polytope in dim d with N vertices: $t_1 < t_2 < \dots < t_N$

$$C_d(N) := \text{conv}\{\mu(t_1), \dots, \mu(t_N)\}$$




Facets of $C_d(N)$

Any d of the vertices $\mu(t_1), \dots, \mu(t_N)$ define hyperplane F in \mathbf{R}^d .

F facet \iff all **other** vertices are on one side of F


Example: $C_3(6)$, vertices **100110**



Gale's Evenness condition


bitstring $s = s_1 s_2 \dots s_N$, $s_i \in \{0, 1\}$ e.g. **100110**

defines facet $F = \text{conv}\{\mu(t_i) \mid s_i = 1\}$ of $C_d(N)$



\iff s has only even-length substrings **0110**, **011110**, **01111110**,

forbidden: substrings **010**, **01110**, ... of odd length.





Polar polytopes

$$P = \text{conv}\{c_1, \dots, c_N\}, \quad 0 \in \text{int}(P) \quad \text{vertices } c_i$$

polar polytope

$$P^\Delta = \{z \mid c_1^\top z \leq 1, \dots, c_N^\top z \leq 1\} \quad \text{facets } \{z \in P^\Delta \mid c_i^\top z = 1\}$$



Dual cyclic polytopes

- vertices = strings of **N** bits with **d** bits "1",
- **no odd** substrings 010, 01110, 0111110, ...
[Gale evenness]

Example: **d=4**, N=6 **d=2**, N=6 (**4** × **2** game)

111100	000011
111001	000110
110110	001100
110011	011000
101101	110000
100111	100001
011110	
011011	
001111	


Vertices of $C_d(2d)^\Delta$ and complementarity

vertex no.	defining facets	labels (example)
1	00001111	
2	00011011	
3	00011110	
4	00110011	
5	00110110	
6	00111100	
7	01100011	
8	01100110	② ③ ⑥ ⑦
9	01101100	
10	01111000	
11	10000111	
12	10001101	
13	10011001	① ④ ⑤ ⑧
14	10110001	
15	11000011	
16	11000110	
17	11001100	
18	11011000	
19	11100001	
20	11110000	

$C_4(8)^\Delta$

Permuted labels

P = dual cyclic polytope in dimension **d** with **2d** facets



only **one** non-artificial equilibrium:

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Lemke–Howson will take long to find it!

Lemke-Howson on dual cyclic polytopes

P								Q							
①	②	③	④	⑤	⑥	⑦	⑧	①	③	②	④	⑥	⑤	⑧	⑦
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1

Lemke-Howson on dual cyclic polytopes

P								Q							
①	②	③	④	⑤	⑥	⑦	⑧	①	③	②	④	⑥	⑤	⑧	⑦
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1


Lemke-Howson on dual cyclic polytopes

P								Q							
①	②	③	④	⑤	⑥	⑦	⑧	①	③	②	④	⑥	⑤	⑧	⑦
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0							

Lemke-Howson on dual cyclic polytopes

P								Q							
①	②	③	④	⑤	⑥	⑦	⑧	①	③	②	④	⑥	⑤	⑧	⑦
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0


$A(4) = \text{path for } d=4, \text{ label } 1$



A(4) is prefix of B(6)

	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12												1 3 2 5 4 6 8 7 10 9 12 11										
	1	1	1	1	1	1							1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1							1						1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1		1	1					1				1	1			1	1	1
3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1						1		1	1				1	1		1
4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1					1		1	1			1	1		1	1
5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1				1		1	1			1	1		1	1
6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			1		1	1			1	1	1	1	1
7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1		1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1
8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1
9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1
10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1
11		1	1				1	1	1	1			1	1	1			1	1			1	1
12		1	1		1	1			1	1			1	1	1			1	1			1	1
13		1	1	1	1				1	1			1	1	1			1	1			1	1
14		1	1	1	1	1			1	1			1	1	1			1	1			1	1
15		1	1			1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1		1	1				1	1
16		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1					1	1
17		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1					1	1
18		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1				1	1

Suffix of $A(6) = C(6) = A(4)+B(6)$



Recurrences for longest paths

$A(d)$ = LH path dropping label 1 in dim d

$B(d)$ = LH path dropping label $2d$ in dim d

$C(d)$ = suffix of $A(d)$

lengths of

$B(2)$ $C(2)$ $A(2)$ $B(4)$ $C(4)$ $A(4)$ $B(6)$ $C(6)$ $A(6)$...

are the **Fibonacci** numbers

2 3 5 8 13 21 34 55 89 ...

Exponential path lengths

longest paths: drop label 1 or 2d, paths A(d), B(d)

path length $\Omega(\phi^{3d/2})$

with Golden Ratio $\phi = (\sqrt{5} + 1) / 2 = 1.618\dots$

shortest paths: drop label 3d/2, path $B(d/2)+B(d/2+2)$

path length $\Omega(\phi^{3d/4}) = \Omega(1.434\dots^d)$

So far:

- NE of a bimatrix game = combinatorial **polytope** problem
- **label** dual cyclic polytopes,
equilibrium at end of **exponentially long** paths
- **but**: fully mixed equilibrium easily **guessed**
by support enumeration algorithms


Extension to nonsquare games

- Extend to $d \times 2d$ games with **hard-to-guess** support (exponentially many guesses on average) **and** exponentially long paths
- Use dual cyclic polytopes with similar labeling as for $d \times d$ games.

Nonsquare games

P = dual cyclic polytope in dimension **d** with $3d$ facets

Q = dual cyclic polytope in dimension $2d$ with $3d$ facets



equilibria:

	0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0	1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
	0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0	1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
	0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0	1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
	0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0	1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
	...	

Equilibrium supports = **exponentially small** fraction of all supports